THE WARRI KINGDOM

 

Atuwatse II the (Olu of Warri kingdom)

The Kingdom of Warri is a traditional state based on the town of Warri in Delta State, Nigeria. Warri is an inland port on one of the Niger River channels in the Niger Delta. The Olu (king) of Warri is the head of the Itsekiri people.
According to Bini and Itsekiri histories Ginuwa, a prince of Benin founded the Iwerre (Warri) Kingdom about 1480. In the 15th century Warri was visited by Portuguese missionaries. At the beginning of the 17th century, a son of the reigning Olu was sent to Portugal and returned with a Portuguese wife. Their son Antonio Domingo was Olu of Warri in the 1640s. Olu Erejuwa, who reigned from about 1720 to 1800, expanded Warri politically and commercially, using the Portuguese to further Warri's independence of Benin and to establish control over a wider area.
Later Warri served as the base for Portuguese and Dutch slave traders. Warri became a more important port city during the late 19th century, when it became a centre for the palm oil trade and other major items such as rubber, palm products, cocoa, groundnuts, hides, and skins. Warri was established as a provincial headquarters by the British in the early 20th century. In May 1952 the government of Western Nigeria changed the title of the Itsekiri ruler from the Olu of Itsekiri to the Olu of Warri, at the request of the Itsekiri. The Ijaw, Urhobo and other people of the community objected to the change, since they felt the new title implied that the Olu was ruler of Warri, not just of the Itsekiri.

 


In 1997, The Federal Government under General Sani Abacha created a Warri South-West Local Government Council, with headquarters at Ogbe-Ijoh, in the Ijaw area of Warri. Due to political pressure by the Itsekiri, the headquarters was then relocated to Ogidigben, an Itsekiri area of Warri. Riots ensued, hundreds died, and six Shell Nigeria installations were taken over by youths. The crisis is known as the "Warri Crisis".


WARRI CRISIS 

While the Ijaw and the Itsekiri have lived alongside each other for centuries, for the most part harmoniously, the Itsekiri were first to make contact with European traders, as early as the 16th century, and they were more aggressive both in seeking Western education and in using the knowledge acquired to press their commercial advantages; until the arrival of Sir George Goldie's National Africa Company (later renamed the Royal Niger Company) in 1879, Itsekiri chieftains monopolized trade with Europeans in the Western Niger region. Despite the loss of their monopoly, the advantages already held by the Itsekiri ensured that they continued to enjoy a superior position to that held by the Ijaw.
The departure of the British at independence did not lead to a decrease in tensions between the Ijaw and the Itsekiri. With the discovery of large oil reserves in the Niger Delta region in the early 1960s, a new bone of contention was introduced, as the ability to claim ownership of a given piece of land now promised to yield immense benefits in terms of jobs and infrastructural benefits to be provided by the oil companies. Despite this new factor, rivalry between the Ijaw and the Itsekiri did not actually escalate to the level of violent conflict between the two groups until the late 1990s, when the death of General Sani Abacha in 1997 led to a re-emergence of local politics.
The title one of the city's traditional ruler, the Olu of Warri, was formerly known as the Olu of Itsekiri. When the title was changed by Awolowo's Western Nigeria government from Olu of Itsekiri to Olu of Warri in 1952, members of the other tribes (Urhobos, Isokos and Ijaws) saw this as an attempt to impose an Itsekiri ruler over them. The title dispute has led to series of clashes between the tribes in Warri over sovereignty.
In 1997, The Federal Government under the late Gen. Sani Abacha created a number of local government areas, including a Warri South-West Local Government Council, whose headquarters it located at Ogbe-Ijoh, in the Ijaw area of Warri. But due to Political pressure by the Itsekiri on the Federal Government, the headquarters of the same local government council was relocated to Ogidigben, an Itsekiri area of Warri.
 

Victims of the crisis

Riots ensued, hundreds died, and six Shell Nigeria (SPDC) installations were taken over, leading to a drop in oil production. The crisis is known as the "Warri Crisis."The headquarters have since been relocated to Ogbe ijaw by the Delta State House of Assembly, a decision that brought relative peace back to the city.
The issue of local government ward allocation has proven particularly contentious. Control of the city of Warri, the largest metropolitan area in Delta State and therefore a prime source of political patronage, has been an especially fiercely contested area. This has given birth to heated disputes between the Ijaw, the Itsekiri and the Urhobo about which of the three groups are "truly" indigenous to the Warri region, with the underlying presumption being that the "real" indigenes should have control of the levers of power, regardless of the fact that all three groups enjoy ostensibly equal political rights in their places of residence.
The root of the Warri crisis is the Kiama Declaration of the Ijaws which was essentially a declaration that the entire Niger Delta Region of Nigeria belonged to the them. This of course is untrue as it is common knowledge that several other ancient ethnic groups like the Ibibios, the Itsekiris, the Andonis, the Urhobos, the Efiks, etc. alongside the Ijaws inhabit the area. The Warri crisis was the beginning of the implementation of the Kiama Declaration by the Ijaws. The Itsekiris, a tiny minority occupying lands containing some 40% of the total oil wealth of Nigeria, were a prime target of the Ijaws and they were to be a quick and gain as the Ijaws envisaged they could easily be runover, considering their status as a minoroty of minorities and the fact that they, unike the Ijaws, were unprepared for war. Simultaneously, in the hope of making quick work of the Itsekiris, the Ijaws took their expansionist agenda also to Edo State as well as to Ondo State where they were brutally halted by the majority ethnic groups in those States. The trigger or opportunity for the commencement of the implementation of the Kiama Declaration and thus of the so-called Warri crisis was when the then Military Administrator of Delta State, Colonel David Dungs, unilaterally announced in a broadcast to the State that the Headquarters of the newly created Warri South-West Local Government Area was Ogbe-Ijoh, an Ijaw settlement, contrary to Ogidigben, an Itsekiri town, as was duly gazetted by the Federal Government of Nigeria. The Colonel Dungs manuever is believed to have been sponsored by the Ijaws, he being not from the area but from far away Plateau State in North Central Nigeria and therefore ought not to have had any vested interest in the matter, and considering that the action was solely to the benefit of the Ijaws. That the Itsekiris put up no resistance initially buttresses this point. That the Ijaws commenced a war rather than a protest and even went on to "capture" and retain known traditional Itsekiri territories like Kantu and Okenrengigho (which they rechristianed "okenrenkoko" contrary to what is on every known map of the area) also buttresses the hegemonic mission of the Ijaws. The so-called Warri crisis therefore was not a crisis but a war of attrition waged by the Ijaws against their Itsekiri brothers with whom they had co-existed peacefully before advent of Ijaw nationalism.

Militants in Army Uniform

                                           THE  BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA AND THERE AGENDA

Introduction
Boko Haram, an Islamist religious sect, has targeted Nigeria's police, rival clerics, politicians, and public institutions with increasing violence since 2009. Some experts say the group should primarily be seen as leading an armed revolt against the government's entrenched corruption, abusive security forces, strife between the disaffected Muslim north and Christian south, and widening regional economic disparity in an already impoverished country. They argue that Abuja should do more to address the issues facing the disaffected Muslim north. But Boko Haram's suspected bombing of a UN building in Abuja in August 2011 and its ties to regional terror groups may signal a new trajectory and spark a stronger international response that makes it harder to address the north's alienation.

Birth of Boko Haram

Mohammad Yusuf, a radical Islamist cleric, created Boko Haram in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of the northeastern state of Borno. The group aims to establish a fully Islamic state in Nigeria, including the implementation of criminal sharia courts across the country. Paul Lubeck, a University of California professor studying Muslim societies in Africa, says Yusuf was a trained salafist (a school of thought often associated with jihad), and was strongly influenced by Ibn Taymiyyah, a fourteenth century legal scholar who preached Islamic fundamentalism and is considered a "major theorist" for radical groups in the Middle East.
Boko Haram colloquially translates into "Western education is sin," which experts say is a name assigned by the state. The sect calls itself Jama'atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda'wati wal jihad, or "people committed to the propagation of the prophet's teachings and jihad." Some analysts say the movement is an outgrowth of the Maitatsine riots of the 1980s  and the religious/ethnic tensions that followed in the late 1990s. Many Nigerians believe Yusuf rejected all things Western, but Lubeck argues that Yusuf, who embraced technology, believed Western education should be "mediated through Islamic scholarship," such as rejecting the theory of evolution and Western-style banking.
Before 2009, the group did not aim to violently overthrow the government. Yusuf criticized northern Muslims for participating in what he saw as an illegitimate, non-Islamic state and preached a doctrine of withdrawal. But violence between Christians and Muslims  and harsh government treatment, including pervasive police brutality, encouraged the group's radicalization. Human Rights Watch researcher Eric Guttschuss told news service IRIN that Yusuf gained supporters "by speaking out against police and political corruption." Boko Haram followers, also called Yusuffiya, consist largely of hundreds of impoverished northern Islamic students and clerics as well as university students and professionals, many of whom are unemployed. Some followers may also be members of Nigeria's elite.
In July 2009, Boko Haram members refused to follow a motor-bike helmet law, leading to heavy-handed police tactics that set off an armed uprising in the northern state of Bauchi and spread into the states of Borno, Yobe, and Kano. The incident was suppressed by the army and left more than eight hundred dead. It also led to the televised execution of Yusuf, as well as the deaths of his father in-law and other sect members, which human rights advocates consider to be extra-judicial killings. In the aftermath of the 2009 unrest, "an Islamist insurrection under a splintered leadership" emerged, says Lubeck. Boko Haram began to carry out a number of suicide bombings and assassinations from Maiduguri to Abuja, and staged an ambitious prison-break in Bauchi, freeing more than seven hundred inmates in 2010.
In November 2011, the group staged its most deadly attacks so far , in Maiduguri as well as Yobe's Damaturu and Potiskum, targeting churches, mosques, banks, and police stations. At least 150 people were reported killed. November's violence garnered more international attention for the group, with condemnations from the head of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Pope, the UN Security Council, and the UN secretary general. Bombings on Christmas Day in 2011 targeting churches and killing dozens raised fears about the possibility of another spate of religious violence  between Muslims and Christians.

Abubakar Shekau (The national leader of boko haram)

 

 

   Rising Against the State         

 Boko Haram is easier to talk about than Boko Haram itself. Injustice and poverty, as well as the belief that the West is a corrupting influence in governance, are root causes of both the desire to implement sharia and Boko Haram's pursuit of an Islamic state, say experts. "The emergence of Boko Haram signifies the maturation of long festering extremist impulses that run deep in the social reality of northern Nigeria," writes Nigerian analyst Chris Ngwodo. "But the group itself is an effect and not a cause; it is a symptom of decades of failed government and elite delinquency finally ripening into social chaos."
The reintroduction of sharia criminal courts was originally proposed by the governor of the state of Zamfara in 1999, but the proposal quickly became a grassroots movement that led to its adoption in twelve states. Experts say there was widespread "disillusionment" with the way sharia was implemented, and that Boko Haram has tapped into this dissatisfaction, promoting the idea that an Islamic state would eliminate the inconsistencies. "You punish somebody for stealing a goat or less--but a governor steals billions of naira, and gets off scott-free," says Jean Herskovits, an expert on Nigerian politics.

Injustice and poverty, as well as the belief that the West is a corrupting influence in governance, are root causes of both the desire to implement sharia and Boko Haram's pursuit of an Islamic state, say experts.

In an August 2011 report, Human Rights Watch notes "corruption is so pervasive in Nigeria that it has turned public service for many into a kind of criminal enterprise. Graft has fueled political violence, denied millions of Nigerians access to even the most basic health and education services, and reinforced police abuses and other widespread patterns of human rights violations."
An Amnesty International report  points out that the Nigerian police force is responsible for hundreds of extra-judicial killings and disappearances each year across the country that largely "go uninvestigated and unpunished." Human rights advocates note that the public executions of Boko Haram followers by security forces, including the ones documented by this video, have yet to produce a conviction. However, the government began in July 2011 to try five police officers connected to Yusuf's killing and in August 2011 began the court martial of a military commander responsible for troops that killed forty-two sect members during the July 2009 uprising.

             

suspected members

 

The North-South Divide

Nigeria is Africa's most populous country, with more than 160 million people and nearly 350 ethnic groups speaking 250 languages. The country is about 50 percent Muslim, 40 percent Christian, and 10 percent indigenous sects. The country has long grappled with how to govern a diverse nation in which religion is one of the most important features of identity. Some experts argue that the ongoing struggle between Christians and Muslims over political power is a significant factor in the country's ongoing unrest. This sectarian violence, particularly in the central part of the country where the north and south collide, has killed more than 14,000 people since 1999, according to Human Rights Watch.
Others note that Boko Haram has killed more Muslims than Christians. "In a country with a history of polarization between the majority-Muslim north and the majority-Christian south, Boko Haram's message is a polarizing one at the national level and within the Muslim community," write Alex Thurston in Foreign Policy. Experts also note that though the northern unrest has been portrayed in a context of extreme religiosity, religious extremism is evident throughout Nigeria, including among Christians.
Despite a per capita income of more than $2,700 and annual GDP growth of 7 percent, Nigeria has one of the world's poorest populations. An estimated 70 percent of the population lives on less than $1.25 a day. Economic disparities between the north and the rest of the country are particularly stark. In the north, 72 percent of people live in poverty compared to 27 percent in the south and 35 percent in the Niger Delta.
"An analysis of public investments in infrastructure and human capital in the northeast would explain why the region is not only home to flawed elections and economic hopelessness but the Boko Haram insurgency as well," writes former Nigerian federal minister Nasir Ahmad El-Rufai. "Indeed, most of the apparent ethnic and religious crises in the North, and the youth violence and criminality in the south, can be linked to increasing economic inequality."
Another crucial factor in economic inequality is oil which is being overwhelmingly dominated by Muslim elites, who have, like their counterparts across the country, benefited from oil wealth at the expense of regional development. The central purpose of the Nigerian state is to divide up the country's oil wealth among elites, making Nigeria's politics a "zero sum game." In the oil-producing delta, for example, groups such as MEND (Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta)--which has attacked oil infrastructure--are largely an outgrowth of the feeling that the south should get more revenue than it already does.
Although these elites still have access to oil wealth, northern Nigerians fear their political influence in the country is waning. "The Nigerian voices heard most loudly around the world, and in Nigeria itself, are Christian and secular, reinforcing the sense among Nigeria's Muslims that they are invisible," G. Pascal Zachary writes in the Atlantic.
The dispute over 2011 election results, which led to over eight hundred dead, also has played a role in Boko Haram's escalating violence. Experts say many northern Nigerians view the presidency of Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian, as illegitimate, arguing that he ignored an informal power-rotation agreement that should have kept a Muslim as president this round. (Muslim President Umar Musa Yar'dua died in 2010, two years into his four-year term.) Voting irregularities during the election as well as efforts to change presidential term limits further alienated the north from Jonathan. Some Jonathan supporters argue Boko Harm's attacks are an attempt, possibly funded by northern elites, to make the country ungovernable for the president.

Boko haram militia

 

Terror Ties and Policy Prescriptions

Experts say the prison-break, use of propaganda, and the bombing of police headquarters in June 2011 indicated an increasing level of sophistication and organization, which could point to outside help. In August 2011, U.S. officials claimed the group has ties to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which operates in northwest Africa, and Somalia's al-Shabaab, another militant Islamist group.
Security officials in Nigeria and internationally are concerned that the group has splintered into one that is focused on local grievances and another that is seeking contacts with outside terror groups (WSJ). "What is most worrying at present is, at least in my view, a clearly stated intent by Boko Haram and by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to coordinate and synchronize (AP) their efforts," said General Carter Ham, head of U.S. military operations in Africa, noting that such a relationship would be "the most dangerous thing to happen" to Africans and to U.S. interests in the region. A 2011 State Department report observes the Nigerian National Police Force has limited capacity to conduct anti-terror operations.
Other experts, such as Lubeck and CFR's Campbell, question the extent of the sect's regional terror ties and say it is unclear which attacks are actually the work of Boko Haram. There is concern that some of the acts may be the work of criminals looking to capitalize on the mayhem (some of the targets supposedly attacked by Boko Haram have been banks, for instance) or perpetrated by other groups hostile to the state. They also argue the group has a legitimate grievance against the country's security forces and that international intervention could distract from policy actions needed to address the underlying issues.
Before the UN bombing in August 2011, the Nigerian government started to look at solutions similar to its quelling of unrest in the Niger Delta, including negotiation and amnesty. MEND leaders were "bought off" by the government and accepted a ceasefire in 2010. But experts say such a solution is unlikely for a group like Boko Haram. "The grievances Boko Haram expresses are more diverse, less material, and are explicitly articulated as religious politics," writes Thurston in his blog.
Analyst Chris Ngwodo argues some kind of federal intervention may be needed, especially in education and healthcare, and greater pressure may need to be exerted on northern elites to develop the region. CFR's Campbell argues that President Jonathan needs gestures, such as naming prominent northern Muslims to his cabinet, to address northern disaffection.
He and other experts also are particularly concerned about the improving economic opportunity in the region, including greater foreign investment, improving infrastructure, and expanding access to Western-style education. "The problem in Nigeria is the government must create the conditions and the incentives, both political and economic, for the people with wealth to invest locally to generate employment," Lubeck argues.
Britain and Israel have already offered anti-terror assistance, and the U.S. military recently discussed sharing intelligence and potentially training Nigerian security forces. Human rights and diplomatic officials note that Nigeria's heavy-handed military approach is compounding their security problem. Campbell warns against too much U.S. involvement on the anti-terror front. "If the United States becomes associated with Abuja's oppression, then we and the international community become fair game," he says, noting that the UN bombing indicates that it is possible this has already happened.

THE TRADITIONAL RULER OF NNEWI KINGDOM

HRH Igwe Kenneth Onyeneke Orizu III, OON, JP,. is the 17th Obi of Otolo and Igwe of Nnewi kingdom. He is the traditional supreme ruler and spiritual leader in Nnewi, an Igbo city in Nigeria. He is a member of the Nnofo Royal lineage and the successor to his father Igwe Josiah Orizu II, his grandfather Igwe Orizu I (Eze Ugbonyamba), and great-grandfather Igwe Iwuchukwu Ezeifekaibeya. Unlike most Igbo monarchies, there were kings of Nnewi before the arrival of Europeans. [1] In Anambra State, Igwe Kenneth Orizu III is the vice Chairman of the Anambra State House of Chiefs and as of 2012 the longest-serving monarch in Nigeria.
Igwe Orizu II was instrumental in the clearing of the Agbo Edo forest. His cousin, Prince Nwafor Orizu was Nigeria's first republic senate President and his grandfather, Igwe Orizu I (Eze Ugbo Onya Mba) was the first Igbo man to own and drive a car. The Ofala Nnewi is a cultural festival held every year to celebrate the coronation of the Igwe of Nnewi.
A man of peace who has done everything is possession to bring unity peace and love to Nnewi and beyond